







A Relational Theory of Mental Illness –
Lacking Identity and Solidarity with Others
Abstract 
In  this  paper,  I  aim  to  progress  towards  the  philosophical  goal  of  ascertaining  what,  if  
anything, all mental illnesses have in common, attempting to unify a large sub-set of those 
with a relational or interpersonal dimension. One major claim is that, if we want a promising 
theory  of  mental  illness,  we  must  go  beyond  the  dominant  western  accounts  of  mental  
illness/health, which focus on traits intrinsic to a person such as pain/pleasure, lethargy/
liveliness, fragmentation/integration, and falsehood/authenticity. A second major claim is 
that the relational facets of mental illness are plausibly understood theoretically in terms of 
a person’s inability to identify with others or exhibit solidarity with them, relational values 
salient  in  the  African  philosophical  tradition.  I  show  that  these  two  extrinsic  properties  
explain several intuitive instances of mental illness well, including, amongst several others, 




1. Introducing Theorisation of Mental Illness
Do	all	mental	illnesses	have	something	in	common?	More	carefully,	is	there	a	
single	property,	or	a	small	handful	of	them,	in	virtue	of	which	a	psychological	
disposition counts as a disorder? Is there one feature that explains why those 
with	abusive,	psychopathic,	narcissistic,	histrionic,	paranoid,	or	phobic	traits	
warrant interventions such as therapy and medication?
It	would	be	intellectually	fascinating	if	there	were	an	affirmative	and	explicit	
answer	to	these	questions.	A	philosophical	mind,	or	at	 least	one	sort,	seeks	
unity and would be pleased upon being able to place all mental illnesses under 
the	 same	conceptual	 heading	 (for	 non-constructivist	 reasons).	Such	 insight	
into what is fundamental to much human life would plausibly be an instance 
of knowledge that is good for its own sake. 
Of	course,	there	might	turn	out	not	to	be	any	essence	to	mental	illness.	Perhaps	
the	most	unity	we	will	be	able	to	establish	is	a	family	resemblance	account,	or	











practical implications. Note that it was largely through theorisation that the 
field	 of	psychology	came	 to	 reject	 the	 idea	 that	homosexuality	 is	 a	mental	
illness.	Roughly,	the	field	 realised	that	being	statistically	unusual	is	not	suf-
ficient	 for	a	mental	 trait	 to	be	considered	an	 illness,	and	that	homosexuali-
ty	cannot	be	easily	grouped	with	other	traits	uncontroversially	classified	 as	
mental	 illnesses,	 in	part	because	of	 the	lack	of	harm	to	self	or	others.1  De-
bates	continue	about	whether,	e.g.,	attention	deficit	and	hyperactivity	“disor-
ders”,	certain	kinds	of	Asperger’s	“syndrome”,	and	dysphoria	consequent	to	
socio-political oppression count as mental illnesses (or at least at which point 
they	do).	A	theory	well	grounded	on	comparatively	uncontroversial	instances	
of	mental	illness	could	help	resolve	these	more	controversial	matters,	thereby	
making important differences in how people understand themselves and are 




latest	version	of	 the	American	Psychiatric	Association’s	 (2013)	Diagnostic 
and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders	 (DSM-5)	 now	 includes	 a	 sec-
tion  devoted  to  some mental  illnesses  centred  on  how people  are  disposed  
to	 interact	with	 others.	Despite	 the	 “widespread	 consensus	 that	 the	 effects	
of relationships and relationship events are so central to every aspect of psy-
chopathology and clinical practice that they must be included somewhere in 
the diagnostic system” (Beach et al.	2006:	3),	it	has	been	only	recently	that	
scholarship  has  begun to  recognise  certain  disorders  qua  relational.  Unlike  
the	DSM-4,	 the	DSM-5	does	include	a	heading	“Relational	Problems”,	but	
it	remains	cautious	about	them,	relegating	them	to	a	part	of	the	book	titled	
“Other	Conditions	 that	May	Be	 a	 Focus	 of	Clinical	Attention”	 (American	
Psychiatric	Association	2013:	715).	
Key	examples	of	what	the	DSM-5	labels	“relational	problems”	are	child	ne-
glect	and	spousal	abuse.	However,	 in	this	paper,	I	argue	that	a	much  wider 
array of mental illnesses can be fully understood only with a relational per-
spective.	If	we	want	a	promising	theory	of	mental	illness,	then	we	must	go	
beyond	the	dominant	western	accounts	of	mental	illness/health,	which	focus	
on	 features	 intrinsic	 to	 a	 person	 such	 as	 pain/pleasure,	 lethargy/liveliness,	
fragmentation/integration,	and	falsehood/authenticity.	For	example,	I	contend	
that extrinsic or relational properties are essential to explain adequately why 
it	is	apt	to	describe	traits	such	as	being	psychopathic,	narcissistic,	histrionic,	
paranoid,	and	phobic	in	terms	of	“mental	illness”.	Although	I	do	not	contend	
relationality is an exhaustive	explanation	of	why	these	are	disorders,	I	main-
tain that it is essential,	i.e.,	that	one	would	be	missing	something	vital	about	
these conditions and many others without appealing to it.
I also in this paper advance an attractive theory of the relational dimensions 
of	psychological	disorders.	I	maintain,	specifically,	that	one	is	more	mentally	
ill,	the	more	one	is	psychologically	unable	to	identify	with	others	and	exhibit	
solidarity	 with	 them,	 showing	 that	 this	 principle	 captures	 many	 intuitions	
about why and to what degree traits such as the above count as mental illness-
es.	Again,	my	claim	is	not	that	every	mental	illness	is	nothing	over	and	above	
a	failure	to	relate	in	these	ways.	Instead,	I	claim	that	many	mental	illnesses	






In the following I start by recounting the dominant western theories of mental 
illness	and	mental	health	(section	2),	highlighting	the	fact	that	they	conceive	
of	them	strictly	in	terms	of	a	person’s	intrinsic	properties,	after	which	I	argue	
that	 these	are	 insufficient	 to	explain	why	many	traits	are	 intuitively	mental	
illnesses	(section	3).	Then,	I	draw	on	ideas	 largely	from	the	African	philo-
sophical tradition to articulate a relational account of many mental illnesses 
(section	4).	Unlike	psychologists	and	value	theorists	in	the	West,	those	whose	
work is informed by sub-Saharan cultures (and in some respect by cultures 
in	 the	Global	South	more	generally)	 tend	 to	prize	 the	good	of	cohesion	or	
harmony,	where	 I	provide	a	specific	 interpretation	of	 it	as	 the	combination	
of  identifying  with  others  and  exhibiting  solidarity  with  them.  I  argue  that  





and rationality is particularly promising when it comes to developing a com-
plete	account	(section	6).
2. Western Theories of Mental Illness
For	about	100	years,	Euro-American	psychologists,	philosophers,	and	the	like	
have  posited  theoretical  accounts  of  what  makes  a  mental  condition  count  
as sick and warrant treatment.2  While obviously unable to address them all  
here,	what	I	do	is	to	recount	several	of	the	salient	theories	to	show	that	they	
have	shared	an	individualist	or	intrapersonal	orientation,	in	which	there	is	no	
essential mention of anyone but the person with the mental illness. It is only 
in the following section that I argue that such an individualist orientation is 
insufficient	to	make	adequate	sense	of	why	an	array	of	conditions	intuitively	
count as mental illnesses.
Let	us	begin	with	Sigmund	Freud,	who	in	some	of	his	 texts	maintains	 that	
the	point	of	 analysis	 is	 to	make	 the	unconscious	conscious	 (1961a	 [1920]:	
12,	1963	[1938]:	224).	The	suggestion	is	that	mental	illness	consists	of	a	pa-
tient’s	behaviour	being	influenced	by	mental	states	of	hers	that	she	does	not	
know she has. Although the aim of becoming more aware of oneself could 
involve,	 say,	 achieving	 cognisance	 of	 previously	 unacknowledged	 feelings	
about	another	person,	it	need	not.	Therefore,	Freud’s	account	of	what	health	
and illness essentially are is individualist in that they make no essential ref-
erence	to	a	relationship	between	the	patient	and	another.	Furthermore,	even	
if becoming aware of oneself did essentially include becoming aware of past 
relationships	with	others,	 that	 is	not	 the	same	as	actually	relating	 to	others	
now,	on	which	an	interpersonal	or	relational	theory	of	mental	health/illness	
focuses.
1   
Some might suggest that it was upon discov-
ering the biological cause of much homosex-
uality	that	the	field	changed	its	mind,	but	that	
is  implausible.  There  are  quite  likely  some  
biological	 causes	 of	 psychopathy,	 autism,	
and	 even	 alcoholism,	 but	 that	 has	 not	 given	
the	field	 pause	at	classifying	them	as	mental	
illnesses. 
2   
I  acknowledge  that  meriting  treatment  by  
a  psychologist  and  suffering  from  a  mental  
illness	 are	 logically	 distinct,	 but	 treat	 them	
as more or less equivalent for the sake of this 






replacing Id with Ich,	tends	to	bring in its wake an improved ability to relate 
to	others	(as	one	would	expect),	the	bare	idea	that	the	point	of	psychotherapy	
is ego expansion is intrapersonal. It does not say that its ultimate point con-
sists of being able to relate to others in a certain way.3
Similar	 remarks	go	 for	Freud’s	other	major	 suggestion,	 that	 the	 therapist’s	
goal should be to relieve patients of suffering and to help them feel pleasure 
without	 contortion,	 disturbance,	 or	 other	 symptoms	 (1961b	 [1930]:	 32–33,	
48;	for	similar	recent	views,	see	Bader	1994:	261;	Fink	2010).	The	capacity	





are themselves considered instances of either mental illness or health. By an 
interpersonal	account,	certain	undesirable	ways	of	relating	with	others	are	to	
be	avoided	 for	 their	own	sake	as	 illnesses,	while	certain	desirable	ways	of	
relating are to be pursued as mentally healthy ends.
The same kind of individualism is characteristic of the array of psychoanalyt-
ic,	psychodynamic,	humanist,	and	self-oriented	theories	that	were	so	prom-




therapist were considered reliable means towards them. Consider the various 
familiar suggestions that the point of therapy and related psychological inter-
ventions	is	to	enable	a	patient:4




[1957];	 Becker	 1971:	 153–154;	 Szasz	 1983:	 19–54),	where	 illness	 in-
volves	being	slavish,	say,	in	respect	of	one’s	emotions;

























in	 life,	 realisation	 of	 personal	 talents	 and	 capacities,	 and	 enlightened	
self-knowledge”	(Ryff	2014),	with	mental	illness	being	a	failure	to	know	
oneself	or	to	develop	one’s	particular	abilities.





1997:	 212–222),	 but	 I	 suspect	 that	 such	 commentators	 are	misreading	 ob-
ject-relations	theorists,	in	that	they	are	failing	to	differentiate	the	claim	that	
certain  relationships  are  a  necessary  means	 to	mental	 health,	which	 an	 in-
trapersonal	theorist	can	readily	accept,	from	the	claim	that	mental	health	is 
















tionality of some kind.




sees some Jewish socialist thinkers suggesting that mental health consists of 
3   
Some  might  consider  it  odd  to  characterize  
self-knowledge	as	a	final	 aim,	since	psycho-
analysts  often  deem  insight  rather  to  be  the  
most	 they	 can	 achieve	 in	 a	 clinical	 setting,	
without  considering  it  to  constitute  mental  
wellness	as	such.	However,	there	are	certain-
ly	texts	that	suggest	otherwise,	and	there	is	a	
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See,	too,	most	of	the	aims	discussed	in	a	his-
torical overview of how psychoanalysts have 






of	 the	soul	are	sicknesses	of	 relationship”	 (Buber	1967:	150).	My	claim	 is	
that  such  relational  accounts  have  not  been  salient  for  the  past  century  of  
Euro-American	reflection	on	the	nature	of	mental	health/illness,	whereas	the	
relational account I advance below is a promising correction.6
3. Disadvantages of Western Theories
Why should  one  think  that  the  intrinsic  accounts  need  correction?  While  I  
readily accept that some mental illnesses do have an intrapersonal dimension 
(cf.	section	6),	I	believe	that	a	number	of	them	also	or	instead	have	an	inter-
personal one that intrinsic properties cannot easily capture.
To	start	off,	consider	that	relationality	indeed	appears	essential	to	accounting	




Interlocutors will  be tempted to say that  such behaviour is  merely a symp-
tom of the illness and not the illness itself. I accept that this position is not 
implausible.	However,	the	alternative	view	that	the	disposition	towards	such	
behaviour merits treatment is no less plausible and is arguably more so. Con-
sider the fact that if some intrinsic feature did not tend to cause a patient to 
mistreat	others,	there	would	be	substantially	fewer	grounds	for	therapeutic	or	
related	intervention.	If	so,	then	it	is	likely	that	part	of	what	makes	something	













• psychopathic/antisocial,	 being	 unable	 to	 sympathise	with	 others,	 being	
inclined	to	manipulate	them;
• narcissistic,	 treating	 others	 merely	 as	 a	 means	 to	 one’s	 sense	 of	 self-
worth;	and
• paranoid,	experiencing	delusions	that	others	have	malevolent	intentions	
with respect to oneself.
The	natural	 thing	 to	 say	about	people	with	 these	problems	 is:	 “They	can’t	
relate!”.	All	of	the	conditions	are	straightforwardly	described	as	involving	a	
defect in how the patient interacts with other persons that merits psychologi-
cal intervention.






There are surely intrinsic properties that cause or explain why the person is 
histrionic,	but	it	is	reasonable	to	suggest	that	the	person	merits	treatment	from	
psychologists and related practitioners in virtue of the failure of relationship.
4. A Relational Theory of Mental Illness 
In	the	previous	sections,	I	noted	that	the	dominant	western	theories	of	what	






Instead of mental health being constituted merely by properties internal to the 
patient,	as	per	much	of	the	western	tradition,	I	contend	that	it	also	needs	to	be	












rican adherents to ubuntu,	the	Nguni	word	for	humanness	that	is	often	used	
to	capture	the	nature	of	a	good	life.	However,	I	interpret	the	ubuntu tradition 
in	a	way	that	would	be	of	particular	interest	to	those	beyond	it,	particularly	
(but	not	solely)	 to	others	 in	 the	Global	South.	For	example,	whereas	many	
indigenous	sub-Saharans	would	prescribe	harmonising	with	ancestors,	those	
whose bodies have died but who continue to live in an imperceptible realm 
on	earth,	I	downplay	contested	metaphysical	claims	in	what	follows.	I	focus	
on the value system centred on harmony and consider its implications for the 
mental health of human persons.




Although those familiar with African cultures tend to associate certain ideas 
with	this	phrase,	in	plain	English,	it	means	little	to	someone	outside	the	fold.	
5   
The  claim  that  mental  health  consists  of  the  




6	   
I  do  not  attempt  to  show systematically  that  
my relational theory is an improvement over 
others	that	have	been	suggested;	it	is	advanced	
as	attractive	 in	 its	own	 right,	meriting	being	
weighed	 up	 against,	 say,	Wakefield’s	 (2006)	







also	 appreciated,	 by	 those	 from	a	variety	of	 backgrounds.	Therefore,	 I	 am	
not seeking to accurately reflect the way that a particular indigenous African 
people	(or	group	of	them)	has	understood	the	above	maxim	about	values.	In-
stead,	I	draw	on	how	a	variety	of	southern	societies	and	particularly	thinkers	
informed by them have understood it to construct a principle that can plausi-
bly capture the nature of mental health and illness.
To	begin,	when	southern	Africans	 say	 that	 “a	person	 is	 a	person”	 they	are	
not	expressing	a	tautology.	Instead,	what	they	mean	usually	includes	the	idea	
that	someone	who	is	a	person,	in	the	sense	of	a	self-aware,	deliberative	agent,	
ought to strive to become a real or genuine	person,	that	is,	someone	who	has	
exhibited	virtue	(e.g.,	Mokgoro	1998:	17;	Gaie	2007:	33).	Someone	with	sub-
stantial personhood has ubuntu	(humanness).	A	true	or	complete	person	lives	
a	genuinely	human	way	of	 life,	displays	desirable	 traits	 that	human	beings	
are	in	a	position	to	exhibit	in	a	way	nothing	else	in	the	animal,	vegetable,	or	
mineral kingdoms can.
Just	 as	one	might	 say	 that	 a	 jalopy	 is	 “not	a	real car”	 (Gaie	2007:	33),	 so	









what  makes the view distinct  from Greek or  otherwise  western eudaemon-
ism  is  the  characteristically  African  understanding  of  what  that  essentially  
involves.  The  second  clause  tells  people  how  to  become  real  persons  and  
exhibit ubuntu,	namely,	“through	other	persons”.	Typically	this	means	by	en-




value system can really be put to work as an account of how to live well and 
be	attractive	for	giving	due	weight	to	individual	interests,	once	one	is	clear	




says of an ubuntu	ethic	that	“harmony	is	achieved	through	close	and	sym-
pathetic	social	relations	within	the	group”	(1998:	17).
• Desmond	Tutu,	renowned	former	chair	of	South	Africa’s	Truth	and	Rec-









rica’s	National	Heritage	Council,	says	that	“ubuntu advocates [...] express 
commitment to the good of the community in which their identities were 
formed,	and	a	need	to	experience	their	lives	as	bound	up	in	that	of	their	
community”	(2007:	91).	
• Nhlanhla	Mkhize,	an	academic	psychologist	who	has	applied	ubuntu to 
conceptions	of	the	self,	remarks	that	“personhood	is	defined	in	relation	to	
the community [...]. A sense of community exists if people are mutually 
responsive	 to	 one	 another’s	 needs	 [...].	 [O]ne	 attains	 the	 complements	
associated with full  or mature selfhood through participation in a com-




of	 the	whole	community.	A	person	 is	 socialised	 to	 think	of	himself,	or	
herself,	as	inextricably	bound	to	others	[...].	Ubuntu ethics can be termed 
anti-egoistic as it discourages people from seeking their own good with-
out	regard	for,	or	to	the	detriment	of,	others	and	the	community.”	(2009:	
69,	71–72)
These construals about what it is to commune or live harmoniously with oth-







close,	 belonging,	 etc.)	 to	 be	 the	 combination	of	 exhibiting	 certain	 psycho-
logical	attitudes	of	“we-ness”	and	cooperative	behaviour.	The	psychological	









construed as the combination of exhibiting certain psychological attitudes and 
engaging	in	helpful	behaviour.	Here,	the	attitudes	are	ones	positively	oriented	
toward	 the	 other’s	 good,	 centrally	 understood	 as	meeting	 their	 needs,	 and	
include	an	empathetic	awareness	of	the	other’s	condition	and	a	sympathetic	
emotional  reaction to  this  awareness.  And the  actions  are  not  merely  those 
likely	to	be	beneficial,	that	is,	to	be	objectively	good	for	the	other	person,	but	
also	are	ones	done	consequent	to	certain	motives,	say,	for	the	sake	of	making	











sharing a way of life with others and caring for their quality of life.
I advance this interpretation on the grounds that it makes sense of intuitively 
attractive	ways	of	life.	For	a	key	example,	consider	that	the	desirable	form	of	












tal health that they are lacking. Consider those discordant individuals whom 
Africans	would	describe	as	“not	persons”	or	as	“animals”;	 they	are	people	








Surely	 the	 reader	 does	 not	 think	 that	 such	people	would	 be	 ideal	 spouses,	
parents,	or	co-workers.	Such	unharmonious	 individuals	exhibit	undesirable	
traits,	and,	as	I	argue	in	the	next	section,	mental	illnesses.
5. Advantages of the Relational Theory
Here I return to the counterexamples I posed to the characteristically west-
ern	 theories	of	 the	nature	of	mental	health/illness.	Recall	 that	 I	maintained	
that quite a number of intuitive mental illnesses have an irreducible relational 
dimension	 to	 them,	 one	 that	 is	 implausibly	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	
features	such	as	a	lack	of	autonomy,	authenticity,	creativity,	pleasure,	or	live-
liness. I now argue that one can do better upon conceiving mental illness in 





as his mind renders him unable to relate in those two ways. Below I contend 



















them.	So,	 some	solidarity	 is	admittedly	 lacking.	However,	what	 stands	out	














of those around them. Patients with these conditions characteristically fail to 
sympathise with others  and instead do what  they at  some level  expect  will  
make	 themselves	 feel	better,	even	when	 that	 is	not	good	 for	others.	Often,	
the inability to feel good enough and to know that others believe one is good 
enough  leads  to  excessive  self-concern  and  hence  a  reduced  inclination  to  
care	for	others.	Recall	I	am	glad	to	accept	that	traits	such	as	a	lack	of	self-es-
teem	count	 as	 forms	of	mental	 illness;	my	point	 is	 that	when	 they	 lead	 to	
giving	undue	weight	 to	one’s	 interests	at	 the	expense	of	others,	 there	 is	an	
additional problem that merits intervention. 
Finally,	consider	the	remaining	conditions,	in	which	a	patient	is	reasonably	
described as having a mental illness substantially in virtue of having compa-
rable	degrees	of	difficulty	both	identifying	with	others	and	exhibiting	solidar-
ity	with	them:
• psychopathic/antisocial,	 being	 unable	 to	 sympathise	with	 others,	 being	
inclined	to	manipulate	them;
• narcissistic,	 treating	 others	 merely	 as	 a	 means	 to	 one’s	 sense	 of	 self-
worth;	and
• paranoid,	experiencing	delusions	that	others	have	malevolent	intentions	
with respect to oneself.
Patients with these traits and those like them are easily able neither to share a 










with	 them	are	worse	off	 than	 those	who	 cannot	 relate	 in	 just	 one	of	 these	
ways.	I	submit	that	those	who	are	moderately	psychopathic,	paranoid,	or	abu-
sive	are	intuitively	more	in	need	of	treatment	than	those	who	are,	say,	moder-
ately avoidant or histrionic.
However,	while	severe	 impairments	 to	both	ways	of	 relating	harmoniously	
are	worse	 than	 a	 severe	 impairment	 to	 only	 one,	 it	 could	 be	 that	 a	 severe	
impairment to one is worse than minor to moderate impairments to both. For 
example,	consider	a	patient	who	has	difficulty	with	both	identity	and	solidar-









identity or solidarity could be absent without the presence of their opposites. 
Roughly,	an	individual	might	fail	to	coordinate	with	others	and	not	subordi-
nate	them,	and	he	might	further	fail	to	help	others	and	not	harm	them.	A	good	
example is someone who is a loner to such a degree that they simply do not 
engage	with	others	at	all,	neither	positively	nor	negatively.	Those	alienated	
from	and	indifferent	towards	others	merit	treatment,	but	not	as	much	as	those	
who are actively discordant. 
The fact that the relational theory grounds an intuitive approach to ranking the 
severity of mental illnesses or the need for treatment is further evidence in its 
favour.	Before	closing,	consider	some	additional	implications	of	the	appeal	
to ubuntu regarding how to conduct psychotherapy or otherwise undertake a 
psychological	intervention.	Supposing	that	at	least	one	major	aim	of	a	thera-
pist should be to help their patients to become real people or exhibit human-
ness,	where	that	means	being	capable	of	harmonious	relationships	with	other	
persons,	we	might	be	led	to	reconceive	therapy	in	certain	ways.
For	one,	 such	an	approach	means	 that	a	 therapist	 should	not	be	concerned	
only	with	a	patient’s	happiness,	but	also	her	excellence.	One	should	strive	to	
help a patient become a person who is not merely better off,	but	also	a	better 
person. Such is the implication of a broad eudaemonist	approach,	which	pre-
scribes tempering the inclination of a therapist invariably to do what is good 
for a patient in the light of a concern to facilitate her becoming a good person. 
For	another,	 if	 the	relational	understanding	of	what	(at	 least	 largely)	consti-
tutes	the	human	good	is	true,	then	a	therapist	should	be	concerned	not	solely	
with	a	patient’s	orientation	towards	himself,	but	also	with	his	relationships	and	
for their own sake in a certain sense. Being able to relate harmoniously with 
the	therapist	or	with	others	in	a	patient’s	life	should	be	considered	not	merely	
a means	towards	mental	health,	but	also	(at	least	partly)	constitutive	of	it	as	an	








tional dimension or even that a given mental illness can be exhaustively un-
derstood in relational terms. My claim has been the more moderate one that a 
complete understanding of the nature of mental illness is implausible without 
relationality.	In	particular,	my	claim	is	that	the	inability	to	identify	with	others	
or  exhibit  solidarity  with  them  is  essential  to  mental  illness  without  being  
exhaustive.	I	briefly	conclude	by	suggesting	some	ways	forward	in	search	of	
a	comprehensive	theory,	if	the	analysis	in	this	paper	is	approximately	true.	
I  have  addressed  eleven  traits  that  are  uncontroversial  instances  of  mental  
illness,	 and	 advanced	 a	 principle,	 informed	 by	 characteristically	 African	
notions	of	harmonious	relationship,	meant	to	explain	in	virtue	of	what	they	
count. It is worth considering whether the list can plausibly be extended. My 




relating in harmonious ways with others. 
However,	there	are,	to	be	sure,	some	conditions	meriting	treatment	that	are	
not	 relational	 in	a	 salient	way.	Depression,	dementia,	eating	disorders,	and	




can inhibit one from participating with them. The current point is that these 
relational considerations hardly exhaust the nature of these problems and do 
not even capture much of them. 
This point begs the question of which intrinsic feature is most promising as 
essential to mental health/illness. My hunch is that the category of intelligent 
deliberation  and  action  is  more  comprehensive  than  long-standing  appeals  
to	a	strong	self,	liveliness,	creativity,	or	the	like	(see	Metz	2013:	413–415),	
so that it is the combination of relationality and rationality that is necessary 
and	sufficient.	However,	that	case	would	require	quite	a	sustained	discussion	
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U radu težim napredovati do filozofijskog cilja utvrđivanja što, ako išta, sve mentalne bolesti imaju 
zajedničko, pri čemu pokušavam objediniti velik podskup onih s relacijskom ili interpersonalnom 
dimenzijom. Jedna je glavna tvrdnja ta da, želimo li obećavajuću teoriju mentalne bolesti, 
moramo ići onkraj dominantnog zapadnog pogleda na mentalnu bolest / mentalno zdravlje 
koje se usmjerava na karakteristike intrinzične za osobu, kao što su bol / užitak, letargija / 
životnost, fragmentacija / integracija i lažnost / autentičnost. Druga je glavna tvrdnja ta da 
su relacijski aspekti mentalne bolesti teorijski plauzibilno razumljivi u smislu nemogućnosti 
osobe da se identificira s drugima ili pokazuje s njima suosjećanje, što su istaknute relacijske 
vrijednosti u afričkoj filozofijskoj tradiciji. Pokazujem da ova dva ekstrinzična svojstva dobro 
objašnjavaju nekoliko intuitivnih oblika mentalnih bolesti, uključujući, među ostalim, bivanje 
nasilnim, psihopatskim, narcističkim, teatralnim, paranoidnim i fobičnim.
Ključne	riječi






Relationale Theorie der mentalen Gesundheit –
mangelnde	Identifikation	oder	Solidarität	mit	Anderen
Zusammenfassung
In meiner Arbeit trachte ich danach, zum philosophischen Ziel der Feststellung fortzuschreiten, 
was, wenn überhaupt, alle mentalen Erkrankungen gemeinsam haben, wobei ich versuche, 
eine große Untergruppe jener mit einer relationalen oder interpersonellen Dimension 
zusammenzubringen. Die eine Hauptbehauptung lautet, dass wir, wenn wir eine verheißungsvolle 
Theorie der mentalen Krankheit ausbauen wollen, jenseits der vorherrschenden westlichen 
Sichtweise der mentalen Krankheit / mentalen Gesundheit gehen müssen, welche sich auf die dem 
Menschen intrinsische Merkmale fokussiert, wie Schmerz / Vergnügen, Lethargie / Lebensfülle, 
Fragmentation / Integration sowie Unechtheit / Authentizität. Die andere Hauptbehauptung 
ist, dass relationale Aspekte von mentalen Erkrankungen theoretisch plausibel begreiflich sind, 
im Sinne vom Unvermögen einer Person, sich mit Anderen zu identifizieren oder Mitgefühl 
für sie zu zeigen, was herausragende relationale Werte in der afrikanischen philosophischen 
Tradition darstellt. Ich zeige auf, dass diese beiden extrinsischen Eigenschaften etliche intuitive 
Formen von mentalen Erkrankungen treffend erklären,  darunter unter anderem gewalttätige,  
psychopathische, narzisstische, theatralische, paranoide und phobische Zustände.
Schlüsselwörter
intrinsisch,	 extrinsisch,	 mentale	 Gesundheit,	 mentale	 Krankheit,	 Neurose,	 Philosophie	 der	
Psychologie,	relationale	Störungen,	relationale	Werte
Thaddeus	Metz
La théorie relationnelle de la santé mentale –
un	défaut	d’identification	ou	de	solidarité	avec	les	autres
Résumé
Dans  ce  travail  je  m’applique  à  établir,  jusqu’à  atteindre  l’objectif  philosophique,  tout  ce  
qu’ont  les  maladies  mentales  en  commun,  si  quelque  chose  en  commun  ont-elles,  par  quoi  
je tente d’unifier un grand nombre de sous-ensembles avec une dimension relationnelle ou 
interpersonnelle. L’une des principales affirmations est d’établir que, si l’on souhaite une théorie 
prometteuse des maladies mentales, on doit aller au-delà du regard que l’Occident pose sur les 
maladies mentales / la santé mentale, et qui se concentre sur les caractéristiques intrinsèques 
de  la  personne,  à  savoir  la  douleur  /  le  plaisir,  la  léthargie  /  la  vitalité,  la  fragmentation  /  
l’intégration et la simulation / l’authenticité. L’autre affirmation principale est celle qui consiste 
à démontrer que les aspects relationnels de la maladie mentale sont théoriquement plausibles 
et compréhensibles dans le sens d’une impossibilité de la personne à s’identifier avec les autres 
ou  à  leur  montrer  de  l’empathie,  qui  sont  les  valeurs  relationnelles  mises  en  avant  dans  la  
tradition africaine philosophique. Je montre que ces deux propriétés extrinsèques expliquent de 
manière exhaustive un grand nombre de formes intuitives des maladies mentales, y compris, et 
entre autres, le fait d’être violent, psychopathe, narcissique, théâtral, paranoïaque et phobique. 
Mots-clés
intrinsèque,	extrinsèque,	santé	mentale,	maladie	mentale,	névrose,	philosophie	de	la	psychologie,	
troubles	relationnelles,	valeurs	relationnelles
